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MONEY 
It is not often accountants attempt the role of futurist— 
we are usually much too busy trying to reconstruct the 
past—so I hope I may be allowed a few preliminary ob-
servations before plunging into this question of what 
will happen to money in the 1970s. 
Money, it seems to me, is the most difficult to predict 
of the several economic factors we have before us today. 
The supply of cash and credit, the businessman's main 
dollar concern, is subject not only to central-bank manip-
ulation, but to political developments, impossible to fore-
cast. The 1960s, if we need a reminder, gave us a searing 
one. Vietnam, a small U.S. involvement, became a full-
fledged war, contributing to inflation and two of the 
severest money crunches of modern times. And no one, 
I imagine, standing ten years ago where I am, could have 
predicted any of those things. 
We can examine economic trends, look at govern-
ment attitudes and do many other things to our hearts' 
content. But always with money there is that implacable 
reality: that the most careful of projections can be upset 
by events wholly beyond the equation. Dante, you know, 
consigned all soothsayers to the Inferno, and I some-
times suspect he made the decision with money predic-
tors foremost in mind. 
The outlook I see for money, with a field of warning 
flags flying, is essentially this: 
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First, the market will remain relatively tight. Regard-
less of how quickly we get out of Vietnam—and it can't 
be too quickly, in my opinion—the demand for credit, as 
I see it, will prevent any return to the kind of easy money 
we knew during the early part of the last decade. 
Second, interest rates will be high by historical stand-
ards. We will probably get some slippage from today's 
dizzying levels, but nowhere near enough to take us back 
to the 4 percent corporate bond of ten years ago, which 
seems destined now for history. In fact, there may be 
times in the next ten years when even today's interest 
rates will appear reasonable. 
Third, the bout with inflation will go on, which will 
mean periods of heightened credit restraint. What we've 
been hearing on economic policy from Washington these 
past few weeks, plus the news of the expected federal 
budget deficits, indicate, I think, just how hard it is, 
politically, to carry through a tough anti-inflation policy. 
As Alfred Hayes, president of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, told the New Jersey Bankers Asso-
ciation a few weeks ago: even if inflation is "somewhat 
diminished in force later in the year, it will continue to 
be an extremely serious problem." 
Clearly, ways must be found to curb inflation now. Re-
straints on money and on tax and spending policies have 
not been effective thus far in slowing down price and 
wage increases. The Administration apparently is under 
pressure to take tougher action in restraining price and 
wage increases. If all other steps fail, some kind of price 
and wage control may be necessary—such as establish-
ing voluntary guide lines. Arthur Burns, Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve Board, has called for an "incomes 
policy . . . [that] might speed us through this transitional 
period of cost-push inflation." What Dr. Burns means by 
an "incomes policy" is not exactly clear, but from his 
remarks, as it has been applied abroad, it has involved 
the setting of allowable increases on prices and wages 
on a voluntary basis. Personally I doubt the efficacy of 
such a broad-brush approach but, /'/ it becomes neces-
sary, an approach by the President on an industry-by-
industry basis to specific union and business leaders 
combined with an ample amount of jawboning on his 
part might be the only practicable solution. 
Now there are two ways, it seems to me, that you can 
view this outlook, apart from disagreeing with it. On the 
one hand, apart from my recommendation with respect 
to wage and price problems you 'can say that it repre-
sents little change from what we have had in three of the 
last four years, which is true enough. Certainly, it implies 
that companies will have to keep scrambling for funds, 
that they will face continuing liquidity squeezes, and will 
have to lean, more than they like, on equity financing. 
On the other hand, if you take a longer perspective, the 
prospect is quite distinctive. At no time in this century 
have we had a period of ten or more years of what we 
could genuinely call tight money. In fact, we have not 
even considered the possibility of such a thing for many, 
many years. 
If you remember the thirties, the popular concern of 
economists was that there would be too much money 
around. Business, they felt, was running out of profitable 
investment opportunities. Without government help to 
spur demand, it would be unable to find enough uses for 
the profits it was generating, so that surpluses would 
accumulate, and private investment stagnate. 
As late as the early sixties, long after the theory itself 
was outdated, the emphasis was still, as a matter of prac-
tical fact, on what you could do with available funds. I 
can recall, for instance, an officer of a large international 
corporation telling me he considered his main problem 
to be finding, year after year, worthwhile ventures in 
which the company could put its money. I might add that 
this same company has since gone twice to the bond 
market with large issues and just this spring went to the 
equity market with an even bigger offering. 
As to why we should be having this aberration now— 
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that, at least, can be fairly easily explained. The causes, 
very simply, are a mixture of the unfinished business of 
the last decade and what promises to be the very vigor-
ous new business of this one. 
Coming out of the sixties we have brought—had to 
bring, as a result of the money crunches—a carryover of 
investment projects, not to mention the need to rebuild 
corporate cash balances. Housing-is, perhaps, the most 
dramatic example of work left undone, but it is only an 
example. Throughout the public and private sectors, 
there are probably enough ventures planned and ready 
to go right now to sustain a respectable level of invest-
ment for several years. 
Now add in the seventies. Some highly conservative 
economists tell us that gross national product will be 
advancing at a rate of 6 percent a year, including some 
inflation, and that business investment will have to grow 
by roughly the same order. We can also expect greater 
demands, and thus heavier pressure on funds, to im-
prove not just the quantitative side of life, but the quality 
of it. Meanwhile, consumer installment debt will continue 
to mount—a whole generation will be coming of age that 
will have been raised with the Diner's Club, rather than 
the hag of security—so that, altogether, the amount of 
new credit needed could be more than twice the credit 
growth of the last decade. 
A much harder question, however, is what corporate 
money managers can do about this situation. One can 
say, as Samuel Johnson did, that the prospect of hanging 
can serve, wonderfully, to concentrate a man's mind. But 
that still leaves the problem of devising an effective 
escape. 
A few weeks ago I told a seminar at the University of 
Wisconsin that I thought the role of corporate financial 
officer had changed tremendously in our lifetime. The 
day is a relic when a company president could choose 
his brother-in-law to act as his chief financial officer, or 
someone he treated as his brother-in-law. The head 
bookkeeper of 1920 is as different from the vice presi-
dent for finance of 1970 as Henry Ford I is from Henry 
Ford II. 
A great many things, subtle and direct, have forced 
this transformation. The internationalization of compa-
nies, the coming of computers and systems engineering 
—these have had critical effects. So has the growth of 
investor and public awareness about corporations, par-
ticularly as it relates to their social responsibilities. And 
so has money management itself. In this flow-of-funds 
era, it has become inordinately more complex and it is 
destined by what seems the shape of this decade to be-
come even more so. 
The financial manager of the seventies, it seems to me, 
will put to a very hard test, indeed, the old saw that few 
things are impossible, given diligence and skills. Spe-
cifically—and to supply as good an answer as I can to 
this problem of how you cope with a long, dry spell of 
credit—let me tick off a few of the "musts" I see facing 
him. 
One, and this is overriding, he is going to have to be 
more imaginative and resourceful about ways of raising 
capital. Even the biggest companies, such as AT&T, have 
to develop innovative financial offerings in order to 
raise money in the amount and terms needed. Smaller 
companies have found that investors, when available, 
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have become increasingly equity-minded. A lot of them 
simply won't touch a financing deal or offering today 
unless it contains an equity "kicker." Companies may 
deplore these trends from now to the eighties. But they 
exist, and management will undoubtedly have to con-
sider much more seriously than it has—or has wanted 
to—such things as rights and warrants. 
Two, projects are going to have to be analyzed more 
carefully and better priorities set. I'm talking now about 
really hard calculations of the cost of capital, return on 
investment, the flow of funds, and the ranking of projects. 
A lot of words have been written about how masterful 
we've become in investment evaluation. But the truth is 
that much of the company screening that has gone on 
has been rudimentary, naive, and designed more to sup-
port a preconceived notion, rather than actually to 
weigh it. 
Three, cash needs will have to be budgeted better, 
which means, in part, working out, and keeping revised, 
long-range projections—for five years or whatever the 
company's horizon may be. Underestimating cash needs 
which means unexpected and costly additional financing 
can signicantly affect the profitability of investments. 
Four, the manager will have to look harder at the 
amount of uninvested cash and excess inventory, par-
ticularly in the hands of affiliates or subsidiaries. The key 
here, as in many situations, is the use of the computer. 
Five, tax options will need to be weighed more care-
fully. There are ways of conserving cash by deferring 
taxes. Depending upon the circumstances of growth and 
assuming continuing profitability, this advantage may be 
for as little as one year or for as long as the life of the 
enterprise. 
Six, whoever the manager is, he will have to get to 
know well, if he doesn't already, his banking sources. 
Quite apart from their credit function, banks can be of 
important help to him in cashflow analysis. 
Now this is a long list, which I have purposely kept 
brief in the hope that we can come back to it in the dis-
cussion period. I am going to leave it at this point, be-
cause I do want to say just a few words about one aspect 
of money in this decade to which I have barely alluded. 
It seems to me that, over and beyond our specific and 
immediate concerns with credit, there is a broader prob-
lem to which we are going to have to address ourselves 
—and soon. The problem is this: Do we really have in our 
present system of financial institutions and capital mar-
kets an effective way of allocating money resources, 
however much is available? 
I mentioned earlier the backlog in housing and what 
I thought would be increasing pressure to do something 
about the quality of life in this country—the ghettos, pol-
lution, the trains that won't run, the flights that leave late 
and arrive later, the noise, the dirt, the eyesores—all 
the rest. I am sympathetic to the problems you gentle-
men have had in raising capital these past few years. But 
I am also somewhat sobered by the fact that, despite the 
pinch of last year, corporate business raised $6 billion 
more in borrowed funds than it did in 1968, while some 
$3 billion less was borrowed for housing and for state 
and local governments. 
The First National City Bank said recently in its eco-
nomic letter that "in 1970 the nation is not only pre-
occupied with the size of the economic pie, and how it is 
cut up, but also whether it is edible without bringing on 
indigestion." I hope they are right about that. I think we 
have had more than enough repeats from our conception 
that all advances in GNP represent good, unmixed with 
ill, and hence, progress, per se. 
President Nixon, to his credit, has established a Com-
mission on Financial Structure and Regulation which, 
presumably, will at some time start looking into this 
question of how we might better allocate our resources, 
given our present priorities. The commission, at latest 
reading, is still without staff or members, other than the 
chairman, Reed Hunt. 
But the real problem is that we have had such com-
missions before. There was, for instance, one, almost 
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totally forgotten, in 1961. And their recommendations, 
after being duly praised, were efficiently filed by the 
President or Congress, either of which was sufficent for 
burial. 
I remember some years ago being in a Washington 
conference which was supposed to be an action meet-
ing, but like so many, it never got beyond rhetoric and 
the restating of a problem that was obvious to begin with. 
Finally late in the afternoon a lady, who was also a 
Roman Catholic nun and a teacher, rose to point out that 
she had attended much the same sort of conference a 
year ago, that little had come out of it but talk, and that 
here she was again. It all reminded her, she said, of a 
problem she had with her old Dodge. She had long been 
worried about what would happen when the odometer 
reached 99,999, because, obviously, there was no room 
for the extra digit of 100,000. She confessed to visions of 
a great br-ring sound, with the whole machine flying 
apart. Finally, she was concerned enough to ask a serv-
ice man who patiently assured her that she had nothing 
to worry about. "You see, Sister," he said, "it just all 
goes back to zero, zero, zero." "Well," the Sister con-
cluded, "that's my feeling about this conference. It's all 
gone back to zero, zero, zero." 
It seems to me that all of us who are concerned about 
money—and the physical welfare of this country—ought 
to be doing all that we can to see that this money prob-
lem of ours simply doesn't go back, once, again, to zero, 
zero, zero. 
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